



R A U L P R E B I S C H 
Technical Editor 
A D O L F O G U R R I E R I 
U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA 
SANTIAGO, CHILE / AUGUST 1979 
C O N T E N T S 
T h e future of the international railways of South America. A historical 
approach 
Robert T. Brown 7 
The basic needs strategy as an option, Its possibilities in the Latin American 
context 
Jorge Graciarena 39 
T h e process of modernization in Latin American agriculture. 
Gerson Gomes and Antonio Pérez 55 
Plans versus planning in Latin American experience 
Carlos A. de Mattos 75 
The Brazilian economy: option for the eighties 
Pedro Sampaio Malán 91 
Contemporary protectionism and the exports of developing countries 
Gary P. Sampson 103 
Economic Policy: Science or Ideology? (Part Two) 
Carlos Lessa 119 
Some CEPAL publications 145 




for the eighties* 
Pedro Sampaio 
Malan** 
T h e discussion of the options open to the 
Brazilian economy for the 1980s will only be 
useful if it manages to break through the 
h idebound technocratic conservatism which 
reduces everything to a question of "compe-
t e n c e " in managing short-term economic poli-
cy. Today as yesterday, the best remedies for 
this disease are a historical perspective, a 
critical evaluation of the changing interna-
tional situation and, no less important, the 
del iberate return of economics to its original 
calling, namely, political economy. 
This article adopts the above approach 
and, is organized as follows: the opening 
section is an introduction which merely 
at temps to sketch out the problem of the 
discontinuity in the performance of the Brazil-
ian economy in 1974. The second section 
deals, in general terms, with events since 
1974, and emphasizes the salient problems of 
political economy in that period. The third 
section analyses the more likely options and 
puts forward some general policies sugges-
tions underlying the argument currently 
raging on this question in Brazil. Finally, the 
fourth section presents the main points raised 
in the article. 
T h i s is an expanded and revised version of the papers 
presented by the author at the seminar on the economic 
situation held in December 1977 in Rio de Janeiro on the 
occasion of the fifth meeting of the Association of Post-
Graduate Economics Centres and the Informal Meeting on 
Industrialization and Development organized by CEPAL 
in October 1978 in Santiago, Chile. 
**The author is a member of the IPEA Survey Institute, 
Brazil. Naturally, the shortcomings of the present article, 
as well as the opinions expressed in it, are the sole 
responsibility of the author. 
I 
From 1974 onwards, the disequilibrium in the 
current account of the balance of payments and 
the change in the rates of inflation have stood 
at the centre of the argument about Brazilian 
economic policy.1 It may be worth repeating 
that these 'problems': 
(a) are not new (on the contrary, they 
constantly recur in the Brazilian experience 
of growth with diversification of the structure 
of production); 
(b) are not the only ones (in fact, in the 
economic and social field there are deeper 
problems than managing the balance of 
payments and controlling inflation); and 
(c) reflect something more important than 
mere economic policy errors or institutional 
shortcomings of the decision-making process. 
Indeed, it is precisely the additional 
elements which should be brought to bear in 
an analysis of the present situation and its 
prospects. The kind of'analysis' which reduces 
everything to a problem of greater or less 
'efficiency' in the management of economic 
policy has practically nothing to say about 
prospects or options, except that they depend 
on suitable policies, which, it must be admit-
ted, is begging such questions as: 'suitable for 
what?' or better, perhaps, 'suitable for whom?' 
In the absence of an open political process 
which takes for granted the fact that there are 
different ways of answering these questions 
and allows them to be expressed in the search 
for political compromises, there arises the 
technocratic illusion of a single 'rational* solu-
tion, a 'technique' dissociated from the social 
fabric which it reflects and on which it acts. Of 
course, this is not to deny the importance of the 
management of economic policy, but merely 
to draw attention to the fact that, besides not 
being neutral from the standpoint of its 
distributive effects, it functions within the 
limits and possibilities offered by more basic 
determinants which are often hidden in short-
term analyses, whose time-horizon is rarely 
more than the brief and misleading period of 
lrThis section principally draws on P. Malan and J. A. 
da Luz, " O desequilibrio do Bataneo de Pegamentos: 
Retrospecto e Perspectivas", in Dionisio Días Carneiro 
(éd.), Brasil: Dilemas de Política Económica, Río de 
Janeiro, Ed. Campus, 1977. 
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one year and which generally deal only with 
traditional indicators of economic activity: 
growth rates by sectors and of the different 
components of total demand, rates of inflation 
and the short-term balance-of-payments situa-
tion. 
This article adopts a broader perspective 
on the structure of Brazilian economic growth 
in the near future, recognizing that it can and 
should be influenced by an economic policy 
deliberately tending to change gradually the 
structure of medium-term supply, so that Brazil 
can tackle what we see as the main challenge 
of the 1980s: the problem of the distribution 
of the benefits of technical progress and the 
burning questions of the satisfaction of the 
basic needs of that large sector, representing 
one-third of the Brazilian population, both 
rural and urban, barely surviving in conditions 
of the most wretched poverty. 
Any discussion of the prospects or options 
of growth and structural diversification of the 
Brazilian economy between now and the 
beginning of the 1980s should try to single 
out the limitations and possibilities of mean-
ingful economic policy options which not only 
envisage a longer time span but also do not 
deal exclusively with the traditional indicators. 
To this end, it is necessary to undertake a 
brief interpretation of the process which led 
to the present situation, emphasizing the 
following points: (a) some of the cyclical 
features of recent development; (b) the 
structure of supply in the Brazilian economy 
in its present stage of capital formation; and 
(c) the effects of its links with the world 
economy over the last decade. 
The above analysis has been made in a 
number of recent documents and publications. 
For the present, we need only summarize the 
main points for our discussion, before proceed-
ing to the analysis of the problem of long-* 
options. 
Between 1968 and 1973, Governme •» o-
nomic policy was basically aimed at maxiii' z-
ing the growth rate of the product in the sh» ^ 
run, with only two restrictions: that the rate 
of inflation should not rise and that, as a 
minimum, the balance-of-payments deficit 
on current account should be covered through a 
net inflow on the capital account. Expressed 
in the language of linear programming, the 
'problem' had apparently been solved through 
the 'proper' management of economic policy, 
thus ensuring the political legitimacy of the 
Government and postponing to some future 
time the awkward questions relating to various 
repercussions in terms of redistribution and the 
social cost of the style of development adopted. 
In fact, it is now becoming increasingly clear 
that the exceptional results achieved by the 
Brazilian economy between 1968 and 1973, 
defined in terms of the traditional indicators: 
real growth rate of the product of nearly 10%, 
with no increase in inflation and a balance-of-
payments surplus (since the inflow of external 
resources on the capital account covered the 
financing requirements for the chronic current 
account deficit and led to the growth of re-
serves and foreign indebtedness), were not 
due solely to a 'rational and pragmatic' eco-
nomic policy designed to maximize the short-
term growth rate by providing incentives for 
'materialistic' private investors and urban 
consumers. Recent studies have shown that 
just as important as economic policy, or more 
so, was the combination of an upswing in the 
economic cycle (due to endogenous causes) 
plus an unusually favourable period in the 
development of the international economy, 
from the standpoint both of trade in goods and 
services and of flows of risk and loan capital.2 
With regard to the problem of the endo-
genous cycle, recent studies on the growth of 
the potential and real product in Brazil 
(Lemgruber, Bacha, Contador, Bonelli-Malan), 
although differing in concepts and methods, 
have shed light on two points worth emphasiz-
ing: (a) the growth rate of the potential product 
in Brazil over the last three decades has 
reached an average of 7% annually in real 
terms, an extremely high historical rate from 
2 For a more extensive treatment of these points and 
;-. 7 mentation of the salient data, see, for example, P. Malan 
ano R. Bonelli, "The Brazilian Economy in the Mid-
Seventies: Old and New Developments" and E . Bacha, 
"Issues and Evidence on Recent Brazilian Economic 
Growth", in World Development, Oxford, vol. 5, N.08 
1/2, 1977, Pergamon Press. See also R. Bonelli and P. 
Malan, "Os Limites do Possivel: Notas sobre Balanço de 
Pagamentos e Industria na segunda metade dos anos 70", 
in Pequisa e Planejamento Económico, Rio de Janeiro, 
August 1976. 
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the standpoint of international patterns that 
reflects the vigorous process of capital forma-
tion in post-war Brazil; (b) at the beginning 
of the 1960s, the real product had grown close 
to the potential product —which amounts to a 
relative maximum use of capacity— and was 
furthest from it in 1967, the period of greatest 
relative idleness in the economy (and indus-
try); (c) the "miraculously" high growth rates 
recorded in the period between 1968 and 
1973, in the order of 10% per year, thus partly 
corresponded to a cyclical upswing in the 
economy initially based on existing productive 
capacity; (d) in 1972 and 1973 the real product 
was once again close to the level of the 
potential product, and this was partly visible 
in inflationary pressures and the balance-of-
payments disequilibrium resulting from a 
policy of higher public and private spending 
on consumption and investment, well above 
domestic production capacity; (e) since then, 
the gap has been widening in such a way that 
the prospects for the near future depend 
essentially on the hypotheses formulated about 
how it will develop. Obviously, the existence 
of idle capacity is not per se a reason for 
bel ieving that a suitable stimulation of total 
demand will suffice for supply to react. Given 
an unbalanced and heavily concentrated eco-
nomic structure like Brazil's, which still 
depends to a great extent on imports of capital 
goods and basic inputs, conventional analysis 
at the aggregate level obscures as much as it 
reveals. 
With respect to the international situation, 
the above-mentioned studies, inter alia, show 
to what extent the extraordinary performance 
of the Brazilian economy depended on the 
unusual growth of the world economy from the 
late 1960s until 1973. While it is true that 
be tween 1967 and 1973 Brazilian exports grew 
at an annual average rate of over 25%, it is 
l ikewise true that during that period world 
exports grew by almost 20% annually and that 
since the 1920s Brazil had not registered such 
high and sustained growth in its import 
capacity (150% between 1967 and 1973). As 
far as international capital flows are concerned, 
International reserves, which rose at an annual 
average rate of 2.7% between 1949 and 1969, 
increased at the extraordinary high annual 
average rate of 24% between 1969 and 1974, 
which explains the ease with which Brazil 
was able to apply a particularly vigorous policy 
of foreign borrowing during this period.3 
Thus the considerable rise in oil prices 
which occurred in 1973 was not the only salient 
feature of the early 1970s. Other major events 
were the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
arrangements, which govern the capitalist 
world from 1945 to 1971, and the synchronized 
boom and recession in the developed eco-
nomies in 1972-1973 and 1974-1975, respec-
tively. The outlook for the initial of the last 
quarter of the present century is not one of 
resumed, prolonged and sustained growth as 
experienced by the major capitalist economies 
since the late 1940s, particularly those 
devastated by the war. It is true that the 
United States is spearheading the expansion, 
with a real growth rate of about 5% in 1976; 
however, it should be recalled that since in 
the two year period 1974-1975 the real product 
of the United States dropped by about 5%, the 
growth of 1976 barely brought about a return 
to 1973 levels. Inflation, previously considered 
one of the characteristics of exotic and ill-
managed Latin American economies, is now 
approaching double figures and has aroused 
controversy and unease in the advanced coun-
tries, showing that expansionary policies must 
be applied cautiously and highlighting the 
importance of "market imperfections" 
(oligopolistic structures and trade union 
power) which underlie inflation. 
Against this background, it is odd that the 
reasons to which the worsening situation of the 
Brazilian economy since 1974 has been attri-
buted have emphasized almost exclusively the 
oil problem. 
True enough, Brazil only produces about 
20% of its apparent consumption. It is likewise 
true that the rise in oil prices considerably 
aggravated this problem through its effects 
on the terms of trade and on disposable income. 
But what is more important is that the oil crisis 
3 See J. Wells, "Eurodolares, Divida Externa e o 
Milagre Brasileiro" in Estudos Cebrap, Sâo Paulo, N.° 6, 
October-December 1973, and J. Wells and J. Sampaio, 
"Endividamento Externo..., urna nota para discussao", 
ibid. 
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demonstrated quite clearly the extremely high 
social costs implicit in a pattern of intensive 
use of resources not produced on a large scale 
within the country, thus raising serious long-
term problems which go far beyond the issue 
of the management of the balance of payments. 
In our opinion, however, it is naive, to say the 
least, to believe that Brazil could have con-
tinued its 'economic miracle' until the 1980s, 
had it not been for the decision of the oil-
exporting countries... 
It would be out of place to pursue this 
question to any greater length. Let it suffice 
to point out that this kind of 'interpretation' 
completely hides the fact that the period 
stretching from the late 1960s to 1973 was 
extremely unusual from the standpoint of the 
international economy4 (an aspect which 
cannot be overlooked in the analysis of the 
'success' of the greater openness of the Brazi-
lian economy during the period, in terms 
both of trade and of international capital flows) 
and bearing in mind various cyclical events 
of an endogenous nature which must be placed 
in a historical context, particularly when 
attempting to redefine basic priorities for eco-
nomic policy. The following section attempts 
to explain why such a redefinition is necessary. 
II 
Between 1974 and 1977, the Brazilian 
economy recorded an accumulated deficit on 
current account of over 24 billion dollars (about 
10 billion in the form of accumulated deficit 
on the trade balance and between 7 to 8 
billion as payment of interest on the foreign 
debt). These 24 billion dollars had to be 
financed through the capital account (and the 
loss of reserves in 1974 and 1975), which 
raised the external debt from 12.6 billion 
dollars at 31 December 1973 to roughly 31 
billion dollars at the end of 1977, thus posing 
serious problems for the future which are 
discussed in the relevant section of this article. 
What must be pointed out here is that 
current account deficits of this magnitude 
(almost 6% of the gross domestic product, on 
average) for four years running reflect, 
simultaneously: 
(a) a level of public and private expendi-
ture on consumption and investment much 
above the domestic production capacity (at a 
given price level); and, what is more important, 
(b) a structure of expenditure and, conse-
quently, an income distribution which cannot 
be maintained with the present level of the 
product. 
Conventional theory states that, in princi-
ple, the 'problem' indicated in point (a) can 
and should be solved by controlling the level 
of total demand through credit and fiscal 
policies.5 However, total demand is made of a 
number of components (private consumption, 
public consumption, private investment, 
public investment, exports), so that controlling 
its level cannot be divorced from changes in 
its structure. Consequently, the fundamental 
question is that indicated in point (b). This 
highlights the shortcomings of the traditional 
mechanisms and the relationship between the 
apparently technical questions of the manage-
ment of the balance of payments (and control 
of inflation) and the basically political ques-
tions of the distribution of income.6 
In order to correct the disequilibrium, the 
real rate of growth of income of one social 
group must fall in relation to that of others. 
4 See , for example, N. Kaldor "Inflation and Recession 
in the World Economy", Economic Journal, December, 
1976; R. Triffin, "International Monetary Collapse and 
Reconstruction", Journal of International Economics, 
September 1972; R. Mundell , "The new inflation and 
flexible exchange rates" in M. Monti (éd.), The new 
inflation and monetary policy, London, MacMillan, 1976; 
and O E C D , Economic Outlook, Nos. 10-20 (December 
1971-December 1976). 
5 S e e T. Swan, "Longer Run Problems of the Balance 
of Payments" in R. Caves and H, Johnson (eds.), AEA 
Readings in International Economics, Homewood, 111., 
R.D. Irwin, 1968, p . 460. 
"See R. Cooper "Currency Devaluation in Developing 
Countries", Essays in International Finance, N.° 86, 
Princeton, 1971, p . 26. 
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Meanwhile, if those who benefit from the 
disequilibrium insist on maintaining the same 
relative rate of growth of real income, if those 
who do not benefit refuse to accept a drop in 
relative real income as a mechanism of adjust-
ment, and if all have sufficient influence to 
express this fact in nominal terms, the natural 
consequence is inflation, as that eminent 
professor Octavio Gouveia de Bulhoes pointed 
out almost 30 years ago when he stated that 
"monetary problems are, par excellence, 
problems of formation and distribution of 
income".7 
If this fact, which far oversteps purely 
economic bounds, is not recognized explicitly, 
the balance-of-payments disequilibrium and 
changes in the rate of inflation will continue 
to be the two most salient 'technical problems' 
of the Brazilian economy in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Together with the more deep-
seated concern for the growth rate of the gross 
domestic product, these three 'problems' will 
tend to relegate to a more secondary or long-
term sphere other questions which are perhaps 
more fundamental, such as the structure of 
urban and rural employment, the reduction of 
poverty and the problems of redistribution. 
There are apparently good reasons for this: 
given the growth rate and age structure of its 
population, Brazilian society needs relatively 
high growth rates to minimize its tensions and 
latent conflicts, thus maintaining the idea of 
an expanding, non-zero-sum game in which 
everyone, without exception, must profit 
through employment, wages, subsidies, 
credit, profits, quasi-rents and capital gains. It 
is a recognized fact that much of the political 
legitimacy of some governments depends 
basically on the overall performance of the 
economy. Until recently, the Brazilian govern-
ments were quite successful in their attempts 
to convince their pertinent public opinion that 
the growth in the concentration of income in 
the 1960s was the natural, but merely tempo-
rary, consequence of the operation of market 
forces during the process of accelerated 
growth. The slowing of growth at a time when 
7 A Margem de um Relatório, Rio de Janeiro, Edicoes 
Financeiras, 1950, p. 34. 
the government is attempting to provide a 
limited opportunity for the institutional 
expression of some conflicts increases the area 
of uncertainty which cannot fail to have an 
effect on the analysis of future prospects. 
The enormous difficulty which Brazilian 
society is having in accepting a prolonged 
slow-down as a means of restoring balance-of-
payments equilibrium and reducing inflation 
shifts the discussion from the problems of 
controlling the level of expenditure (public and 
private, on consumption and investment), 
which should remain high, to the problems of 
changes in its composition. This raises the 
basic problem of the need to define priorities, 
since the period of euphoria has ended in 
which it was believed that all activities could 
be financed at once, forgetting that the 
question is not so much one of the obtention of 
financial resources but oîreal resources which 
have to be imported if they are unavailable 
locally. 
The attempt to continue investing in 
ambitious infrastructure projects (energy, 
transport and communications), increase social 
investment (sanitation, education, health) and 
at the same time 'carry out import substitution 
in the capital goods and basic inputs sectors' 
raises serious problems of competition be-
tween the public and private sectors for the real 
and financial resources, problems which lie at 
the heart of the recent controversy over 'state 
ownership'. Althouth the main limitation on 
growth, now and in the near future, is an 
external one, there is also an internal limitation 
connected not only with the level of domestic 
saving but also with the process of tapping it 
(compulsorily and voluntarily), and of man-
aging and allocating it in accordance with 'non-
market' criteria. Due to their size, the large 
public and private enterprises also need do-
mestic financing to cover their internal costs, 
which in the last analysis limits financing (and 
increases its cost) for the less modern sectors of 
the economy which are less oligopolistic than 
the modern ones, and more subject to liquidity 
squeezes. This is not to suggest that total 
domestic saving is insufficient to finance a 
specific level of investment. In fact, in our 
compartmentalized financial system, saving is 
"more than sufficient" for some ends and "less 
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than sufficient" for others. It would appear that 
the solution to this dilemma would involve 
ei ther increasing the already very large share of 
the public sector financial institutions in the 
tapping, management and allocation of finan-
cial resources, or else a major institutional 
change in the private financial system. 
Consequently, the options outlined in 
government plans, declarations of intent and 
activities still face major problems which must 
be solved in a process which, in the final 
analysis, is far more political than technical. 
Ironic as it may seem, in its attempt to avoid the 
political responsibility accompanying an 
explicit definition of priorities, Brazil may 
perhaps not be advancing along the lines 
suggested by some, consisting in a revision of 
the basic lines of the "model" by placing 
greater emphasis on the domestic market, 
national entrepreneurs and mass consumption, 
bu t instead be progressing further along the 
two basic lines which have characterized the 
"mode l " since the war: higher public invest-
ment and increasing manipulation of incen-
tives designed to raise the private profitability 
of the modern sectors, in which foreign capital 
occupies a predominant position thanks to its 
control over the key variable, technology. In 
the absence of significant political changes, 
and without any sign of them in the offing, the 
progressive 'internationalization' of the Brazi-
lian economy with its corresponding forms of 
consumption and distribution, structure of the 
product and other less tangible features, is a 
fact with which an increasingly large number of 
Brazilians will have to learn to live —at least in 
the near future. 
It should be pointed out that the kind of 
analysis we advocate is not a speculation about 
the possible magnitudes of the growth rates of 
the gross domestic product and its components 
over the next ten years. It is even possible that 
the Brazilian economy will continue growing at 
an annual average long-term rate close to the 
(high) historical rate, given the rate of gross 
capital formation by the government and the 
private sector (foreign and national), various 
growth prospects in the national economy and 
the fact that Brazilian society practically needs 
an economic policy aimed primarily at growth 
as a form of political legitimation of a 'national 
project'. The problem is rather to analyse some 
of the long-term consequences and social, 
political and human costs openly or tacitly 
involved in a specific type of growth, whose 
content has given rise —rightly— to arguments 
which apparently will not die down over the 
next few years. Quite the contrary. In this 
connexion, it is worth quoting a paragraph from 
a recent publication dealing with Argentina: 
"Furthermore, the use of force instead of 
compromise to impose policies is almost bound 
to polarize sectoral clashes and the struggle 
over income shares into extremist political 
ideologies. This outcome can only be avoided 
by broadening effective political and economic 
participation which, even if carried out by a 
benign one-party of military dictatorship, 
requires the strengthening of mediative in-
stitutions capable of resolving interest group 
conflicts. The search for mediative policy 
alternatives is therefore likely to continue at 
least on the part of those who do not see any 
possibility for the immanent appeareance of a 
philosopher king or for the introduction of a 
social system that completely sublimates 
human conflict."8 
Of course, these ideas are not new. They 
are incorporated in the political practice of the 
socially and culturally more advanced soci-
eties, with which Brazil hopes to catch up in 
'economic' terms. The remainder of this article 
consists of an analysis of this possibility and an 
outline of an alternative which necessarily 
touches on question connected with the profile 
of supply and the selective control of demand, 
after long-term si cial priorities have been 
defined from the political standpoint. 
8R. D. Mallon aiv' J. Sourrouille, Economic Policy-
making in a Conflict Si iety: The Argentine Case, Harvard 
University Press, 1975, p. 163. 
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III 
Our starting point is a simple fact: it is increas-
ingly clear to the more keen-sighted observers 
that the exaggerated euphoria of the period 
1968-1973, partially expressed in the second 
national development plan, must be aban-
doned and that the shortage must be clearly 
recognized of real resources with which 
simultaneously to attain high growth rates of 
the gross domestic product, stabilize the rate of 
inflation, achieve surpluses (which are now 
necessary) on the trade balance, reverse the 
concentration of income and wealth, reduce 
rural and urban poverty, reduce regional 
imbalances and mitigate the worsening of 
living conditions in the major urban centres. 
It must be admitted that the conservative 
viewpoint has always been aware of the so-
called "problem of scarcity", and has made 
skillful political use of this awareness, when 
expressing it, in the following ways: 
(a) by establishing the first three 'objec-
tives ' (gross domestic product, inflation and 
balance of payments) as permanent priorities 
which must be made compatible from the 
' technical ' standpoint; and 
(b) by viewing the other 'objectives' and 
'social' problems which may eventually be 
solved in the long term through a slow, sure 
and steady process, for which the population is 
asked —or forced— to be patient. 
Although hitherto apparently successful 
(in convincing the public at which it is aimed), 
this distinction is not legitimate, since it does 
not seem to be easily compatible with rela-
tively open political systems, involves an 
indefinite time horizon (although suggesting 
that it will not be very long) and assumes a great 
capacity for co-opting social groups through the 
gradual spread of a specific pattern of con-
sumption. 
As recent studies have shown, this possi-
bility of a gradual spread of 'modern' consump-
tion patterns does in fact exist.9 Finally, during 
<JSee J. Wells, Growth and Fluctuations in the Brazi-
lian Manufacturing Sector During the 1960s and Early 
1970s, particularly chapter 3 {doctoral thesis for Cambridge 
University, United Kingdom, 1977). See also P. Malan and 
J. Wells "Furtado e a análise do modelo brasileiro" in 
the last decade real disposable income more 
than doubled, relative prices —and financing— 
developed in such a way as to favour consump-
tion of so-called modern goods, and, last but not 
least, the demonstration effect seems to have 
played an important role in forming the 'tastes 
and preferences' of the relatively higher-
income urban consumers. For optimists, this 
process could and should continue until there 
is a genuine mass consumption of durable 
goods whose paradigm, as is often mentioned, 
is the affluent society of the United States. It 
would be out of place to discuss here to what 
extent such expectations are optimistic and the 
length of the implicit t ime horizon and even the 
feasibility of the process. What must be pointed 
out is that the spectacular rise in oil prices, far 
more than creating a problem of balance-of-
payments adjustment in the short and medium 
term, called into question the basis of a 'model' 
of capital formation largely aimed at repro-
ducing consumption patterns of economies 
where per capita income is several times 
higher than in Brazil, which have a different 
social infrastructure and a different level of 
State property and —above all— which do not 
have the enourmous social flaws which make 
pariahs of almost 30 million Brazilians. 
At present in Brazil, there is broad and 
growing recognition of the fact that it has 
become more difficult to 'sell' politically the 
conservative model outlined above, without a 
closed authoritarian political system of indef-
inite duration. The awareness of the difficulties 
and historical importance of today's decisions 
has not yet been expressed in a coherent set of 
concrete proposals which could constitute a 
politically viable alternative for what is 
currently being done (which, it may be said in 
passing, contains a great deal that we consider 
correct in terms of the direction, ranking and 
more exact definition of priorities). This is to 
some extent comprehensible: as we suggested 
at the beginning of this article, there are no 
single technical solutions for such complex 
problems. Consequently, what follows is 
merely an attempt to contribute to a broader 
discussion, by putting forward some sugges-
tions about the general policy lines to serve as a 
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basis for the (necessary) effort to change the 
structure of Brazilian economic growth in the 
medium and long term. 
Any analysis of this question must neces-
sarily deal with the following points: 
(1) The competition for real and financial 
resources between the public and private 
sectors and, particularly, the question of the 
supply of public goods and services vis-à-vis 
the supply of private goods and services. In our 
opinion, the Government has placed itself too 
much on the defensive in this respect and has 
tended rather to allay the fears of the private 
sector as concerns the alleged nationalization 
of the economy than to define clearly its own 
priorities in this field; 
(2) The role played by the large public and 
private enterprises, which in Brazil today is 
much the same as the discussion of the function 
of foreign and associated national capital in the 
Brazilian economy. With respect to the large 
enterprises, the famous trilateral approach of 
government rhetoric should be evaluated 
carefully and critically along the lines of an 
objective sectoral analysis. 
When studying the apparently technical 
measures which must be taken to find a long-
term solution to the present disequilibrium, it 
is of the utmost importance to bear in mind 
these two key problems. Those measures 
include: (a) control of the growth rate of total 
expenditure: (b) the changing of relative prices 
so as to stimulate substitution not only in 
consumption but also in production; (c) selec-
tive control of demand; and (d) selective 
control of supply. Each of these is analysed 
below. 
(a) Control of the growth rate of total spending 
The time is definitely past when it might be 
expected that the economy would continue 
growing in line with the growth of its potential 
product simply by controlling total demand. 
Given the heterogeneity of the various sub-
Pesquisa e Planejamento Económico, the Journal of the 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning (IPEA)r Rio de 
Janeiro, December 1972. 
markets of goods and labour, this approach 
tends to create a situation of excess demand 
(bottlenecks) in a number of sectors and 
markets and excess supply in other sectors and 
markets which, in conditions of downward 
price rigidity, leads to an acceleration of 
inflation long before full capacity is reached. In 
these circumstances, the reduction of the 
growth rate of the level of total spending may 
further worsen the situation by leading to a 
disastrous combination of 'stagflation'. In 
addition, the Government does not effectively 
control total spending but only some of its 
principal components: public consumtion and 
investment and, more indirectly, private 
consumption and investment. The decisions 
concerning the desired growth of each 
spending component and, above all, the 
composition of consumption and investment 
are much more political than technical, but 
from the technical standpoint they involve 
much greater selectivity than traditional 
policies (monetary, credit and fiscal) in 
controlling the growth rate of total spending. In 
the eyes of less alert observes, this is precisely 
what appears to be an undesirable degree of 
intervention by the public sector in the 
economy. In our opinion, this intervention is 
inevitable and should take the forms discussed 
in the following points. 
(b) Changes in relative prices 
At first sight, it might seem odd to include 
deliberate changes in relative prices (and thus 
in relative remuneration) as one of the broad 
lines of economic policy. In the last analysis, 
these changes should be determined purely by 
the 'market', as the economists would say, if 
there exists great mobility of factors. A general 
policy suggestion would be to seek ways of 
increasing that mobility. Meanwhile, it must be 
recognized that in Brazil the past experience of 
growth with structural diversification has 
always gone hand in hand with transfers of real 
resources based on the inequality of access to 
scarce resources (particularly credit and 
foreign exchange) which primarily benefits the 
public sector and the large enterprises (particu-
larly foreign enterprises and national ones 
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connected with the commercial banks).10 
As a result, in Brazil the modification of 
relative remuneration takes the form of selec-
tivity in the allocation and in the forms of access 
to these scarce resources, which is exactly what 
the National Economic Development Bank, for 
example, has been doing in trying to stimulate 
import substitution in the capital goods and 
basic inputs sector. However, this selectivity 
could also be applied to the definition of 
conditions of access to scarce resources in order 
to provide disincentives for certain economic 
activities both in production and consumption. 
In fact, what is being discussed today is the 
need for selective control over demand and 
supply along the lines suggested below. 
(c) Selective control of demand 
One of the central problems currently facing 
the Brazilian economy is that of maintaining a 
relative control, in the short and medium term, 
over the real level of total spending and at the 
same time shifting internal and external 
demand towards goods produced in the 
country. This shift can be carried out, for 
example, by a real devaluation of the exchange 
rate or import restrictions,11 but in any event it 
depends on the elasticity of substitution of 
consumption and on the elasticity of supply of 
the domestic sectors producing international 
goods (which are exportable and can compete 
with imports). At present, and in the immediate 
10As a perspicacious observer points out "... if you do 
not have a capital market, a (long-term) loan market, and 
you want capital formation, you have to have some kind of 
internal mechanism that assures the large firms growing 
profits ... The absence of the capital market is a barrier to 
entry except by foreign firms. The large firms that do exist 
der ive their profits to a large extent from favoured access to 
the underpriced and scarce resources, and their entre-
preneurship is devoted mostly to increasing their share of 
the scarce resources". E. Despres, "Stabilization and 
Monetary Policy in Less Developed Countries", in J. 
Markham and G. Papanek (eds). Industrial Organization 
and Economic Development, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 
1970, p . 408. 
n I n the first case (devaluation) both external and 
internal demand are affected; in the second (import 
restrictions), only the domestic demand for imports is 
shifted towards goods produced within the country which 
can compete with imports or towards exclusively domestic 
goods and services if domestic supply is elastic in the short 
term and the goods are substitutes (although not perfect). 
future, this latter category of goods must 
receive priority attention since in the next few 
years Brazil needs to generate a surplus on its 
trade balance. In other words, the natural 
solution (i.e., from the standpoint of the 
internal logic of the system) in this situation is 
gradually to step up the allocation of real 
resources to the international sector of the 
economy. 
This gives rise to a conflict of tremendous 
importance in the long term. Almost all the so-
called social sectors (education, health, sanita-
tion, housing for low income families, nutri-
tion, etc.) belong to the category of non-
international goods and services, whose 
production and consumption, particularly in 
the case of public goods, must be stimulated. 
However, these activities compete for financial 
and real resources with the international 
activities. When 'market' considerations alone 
prevail, the latter enjoy a comparative advan-
tage in this conflict, since technical progress is 
biased towards them and in addition the central 
government pays more attention to them. 
However, a long-term approach would suggest 
far greater concern for the productivity of non-
international activities, including non-export-
able food crops, public services and the social 
infrastructure.12 
Thus the problem is not purely one of the 
structure of demand. As is well known, the 
latter depends on the level of distribution of 
income and wealth, the structure of relative 
prices, what have come to be called the 'tastes 
and preferences' of the 'sovereign' consumer 
and, last but not least, the availability of goods 
and services as expressed in a given structure of 
supply. For those who do not believe that 
consumers, voting with their money freely 
determine this structure, this is precisely 
where the basic problems lie, from the stand-
point of a long-term attempt to accelerate the 
1 2In what has become a classic article, W. Baumol 
shows that in a two-sector economy, one of which faces 
limitations from the standpoint of technical progress, and 
where both are faced with equally rising costs, the sector 
where the growth of productivity is limited is doomed to 
deteriorate —-unless the demand for its products is income 
elastic and/or price inelastic. The alert observer will notice 
the analogy with what is pointed out above. 
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process of bringing supply into line with the 
demand profile which would result from a firm 
commitment to redistribution. 
(d) The selective control of supply 
A recent study on the choice of technology in 
Brazil,13 concludes a major piece of empirical 
research with the following observation: 
"...once the composition of output is deter-
mined, certain employment [and distribution ] 
patterns are implied. To increase employment 
[ a n d improve distribution] one must start one 
step back, in the choice of products. Here large 
improvements in labour absorption should be 
achievable by government inducements to 
produce labour-intensive products, rather than 
to produce any particular product in a labour-
intensive manner... Looking back at Brazil's 
industrialization drive ... poor employment 
results during the period probably should not 
be blamed on the fact that many of the leading 
firms are foreign, but rather on what those 
foreign firms were producing". 
However, thinking along these lines 
involves a great deal more than merely stimu-
lating immediately the growth of capacity in 
the sectors which may become future bottle-
necks, by applying a 'demand forecast' policy. 
T h e aim now is to change the composition of 
output in the Brazilian economy. In the agricul-
tural sector, greater attention should be paid to 
the types of food which are more important for 
consumption by low-income families, and in 
industry, to the obtention of products which 
use labour-intensive technology, and in the 
tertiary sector, a (non-regressive) supply of 
basic public services and social infrastructure. 
Since these changes in the composition of 
the product must go much further than what the 
private sector would 'naturally' carry out in 
obeying market signals as expressed in changes 
in relative prices, this suggestion implies 
continued broad government intervention in 
the economy, which is at present a source of 
concern to many people. 
Some people believe that the Brazilian 
public sector simply does not have the co-
ordinating capacity to undertake this difficult 
job, since it is a centralizing agent from the 
standpoint of the extraction of resources, but 
decentralizing and contradictory from the 
standpoint of its fragmentary execution of 
policies. 
There is much truth in this argument, but 
the possibility of a greater centralization of 
power as an alternative solution, should not be 
denied —nor, for that matter, suggested. The 
broad need for intervention must be recog-
nized, but without ceasing to insist on the need 
to multiply the controls exercised by civil 
society —and not merely the business world— 
over the State apparatus. It is on this that the 
possibility of having alternative options for the 
1980s depends. 
IV 
This article has attempted to show that, as 
regards the structure of growth of the Brazilian 
economy, the options open for the 1980s have a 
more probable direction, or better, a line of 
least resistence which is rooted in the charac-
teristics of development over the last two or 
three decades and in the present political 
process of identifying the most pressing 
13S. A. Morley and G. W. Smith, "The Choice of 
Technology: Multinational Firms in Brazil", Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 25, N.° 2, January 
1977, p. 262. 
economic and social problems. In practice, 
although not in rhetoric, this most probable 
direction, as identified in the article, tends 
permanently to postpone for some far-off future 
a number of basic questions which, in our 
opinion, represent the great challenge which 
Brazilian society will have to tackle in the 
1980s; the redistribution of wealth and income, 
the reduction of urban and rural poverty and 
the satisfaction of the basic needs of that large 
sector —almost one-third— of the Brazilian 
population currently surviving with life styles 
which are not compatible with human dignity. 
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We emphasize that the possibilities of 
answering this challenge depend not so much 
on the creative social imagination of the tech-
nobureaucracy (if it has one) as on a more open 
political process in which it is possible to 
articulate, mobilize and express conflicting 
interests, particularly those of the population 
which is currently excluded. In the absence of 
such a process, it would be difficult to suppose 
that supply can be restructured (in the sense 
described in this article), as would be neces-
sary in order to tackle this challenge properly, 
and not postpone it as in the past. It is 
extremely important to note, however, that the 
need to think of options like those sketched out 
here for discussion purposes cannot be 
justified in purely 'economic' terms. The point 
in question is not the capacity of growth of the 
gross domestic product of the Brazilian 
economy, but its composition and above all its 
compatibility with an open political system, 
something which would appear to be difficult 
to reconcile with the structure of growth in 
recent years. 
